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SPECIAL FEATURE
CHICKASAW NATION V. UNITED STATES: THE
BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE INDIAN-LAW CANONS
IN STATUTORY CASES AND THE START OF THE
JUDICIAL ASSAULT ON THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP?
Graydon Dean Luthey, Jr. of the Oklahoma Bar*
I. Introduction
The significance of Chickasaw Nation v. United States' arguably transcends
the obscure question of statutory construction involving federal taxation of tribal
pull-tab operations that the decision resolves. The Court in Chickasaw Nation,
in a clever assault on the primacy of the Indian canons of construction, through
an unprecedented reading out of statutory text to avoid ambiguity, implicitly
underscored a subtle assimilationist agenda that, if unchecked, foreshadows
significant consequences for decades of established Indian law. In the end,
Chickasaw Nation can be read as suggesting that even the continued judicial
recognition of the trust relationship between the federal government and Indian
tribes could be in jeopardy under the Rehnquist Court.
II. The Issue Presented
Chickasaw Nation presented the Court with an inter-circuit conflict
concerning the application of section 20(d) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act.2 That section provides:
(d) Application of Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(1) The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(including sections 1441,3402(q), 6041, and 60501, and chapter 35
of such Code) concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes
with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering operations
* B.A. in Letters, J.D., University of Oklahoma; adjunct professor of law, University of
Tulsa; shareholder, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C. Mr. Luthey argued
Chickasaw Nation before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Nation and its co-petitioner, the
Choctaw Nation. The views expressed herein are solely the author's and not the views of either
Nation.
1. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 2719(d) (2000).
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shall apply to Indian gaming operations conducted pursuant to this
chapter, or under a Tribal-State compact entered into under section
2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in the same manner as such
provisions apply to State and wagering operations?
At issue was whether the express parenthetical references to IRC chapter 35,
which affords to state governmental lotteries an exemption from federal excise
taxes, provides the same tax-exemption to tribal pull-tab operations, which are
lotteries under the IRC.
The statutory provision is ambiguous. The Tenth Circuit4 resolved the
ambiguity against the tribes by reading out the ambiguous portion of the statute,
then determining the statute to be unambiguous, and concluding that application
of the Indian-law canon requiring resolution of statutory ambiguity in favor of
the Indians was unnecessary.' The Federal Circuit,6 addressing the same issue
only weeks after the Tenth Circuit, found the provisions ambiguous, applied the
Indian-law canon, expressly criticized the Tenth Circuit for failing to do so, and
pursuant to that canon resolved the ambiguity in favor ofa tax-exemption for the
tribes.
In the Supreme Court, the Nations' opening brief accepted as a given the
ambiguity of the statutory provision as written, which language even the Tenth
Circuit conceded was "cryptic."7 The Nations devoted the bulk of their opening
brief to demonstrating that the legislative history did not resolve the ambiguity
against a tax-exemption for tribal gaming, that such an exemption was consistent
with the federal Indian policy represented in IGRA, and that the Supreme Court,
in every case of actual textual ambiguity where Indians claim a tax-exemption,
had applied the Indian canon requiring construction ofthe ambiguity in favor of
the tribes rather than the general tax-exemption maxim requiring construction
of ambiguities in tax-exemptions in favor of the federal government. The
federal government's brief claimed that no construction of the text could support
the tribe's claim of exemption, that the question arose from statutory language
enacted "by mistake," that the language creating the ambiguity should be read
out, and that in any event the general tax-exemption maxim should trump the
Indian canon because in cases in which an exemption was claimed only on pure
3. Id.
4. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000).
5. Statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
6. Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
7. Brief for Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (No. 00-507),




policy (and not on textual ambiguity) the Court applied the general tax-
exemption maxim.8 In reply9, the Nations demonstrated that in fact a
grammatical reading of the statute giving effect to every word of the statute was
possible, that none of the general tax-exemption maxim Indian cases involved
textual ambiguity, that the federal government failed to show how the legislative
history established that the statute contained a mistake warranting a reading out
of chapter 35 from the statute, and that no Supreme Court precedent supported
reading out any portion of a statute which could otherwise be given effect.
At the oral argument three particularly important events occurred.'" First,
Justice Scalia, author of the County of Yakima opinion stating that if an Indian
law statute was capable of two possible constructions," then the possible
construction in favor of the Indians must control, directly challenged the
government by stating that the Nations' construction was both possible and gave
effect to every word of the statute.'2 Second, the Chief Justice made clear his
view that the Court's long held Indian-law canon of construction requiring
construction of statutory ambiguity in favor of the Indians, should not apply to
statutory ambiguity but must be limited to treaty issues. 3 Third, Justice Breyer,
who ultimately authored the Court's opinion, solicited and did not challenge, a
detailed description of the legislative history, which showed how "chapter 35"
was expressly regarded by the legislative history as synonymous with
"taxation," which the phrase "chapter 35" replaced, and therefore how chapter
35 came to the statute during the progress of the legislation. 4 That complete
legislative history was explained as consistent with the Nations' proffered
construction.
III, The Opinion
A. The Court's Reading Out of the Ambiguity and the.Rejection of the Nations'
Grammatically Possible Construction
For Indian law practitioners, the significance of Chickasaw Nation is not so
8. Brief for Respondent, Chickasaw Nation (No. 00-507), available at 2001 WL 705826.
9. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Chickasaw Nation (No. 00-507), available at 2001 WL
825963.
10. The transcript of the oral argument is available at 2001 WL 1183439.
11. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251,269 (1992).
12. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Chickasaw Nation (No. 00-507), available at 2001
WL 1183439, at *39-40 (Oct. 2, 2001).
13. See id. at *20.
14. See id. at* 16-18.
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much the result but rather the process employed by the Court in reaching that
result. The Court began its analysis by implicitly recognizing the statutory
ambiguity:
The subsection says that Internal Revenue Code provisions that
"concer[n] the reporting and withholding of taxes" with respect to
gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as
they apply to States. The subsection also says in its parenthetical
that those provisions "includ[e]" Internal Revenue Code "chapter
35." Chapter 35, however, says nothing about the reporting or the
withholding of taxes. Rather, that chapter simply imposes taxes -
excise taxes and occupational taxes related to gambling - from
which it exempts certain state-controlled gambling activities. 5
In discussing the Nation's argument, the Court omitted the complete
description of the subsection's language outside the parenthetical by stating
that the subsection's language "applies to those Internal Revenue Code
provisions that concern 'reporting and withholding'. '"'6 The Court failed to
provide the further statutory language, "of taxes." That further language
makes incorrect the Court's statement that "[t]he other four parenthetical
references are provisions to that concern, or at least arguable concern,
reporting and withholding," because § 60501 has nothing to do with reporting
or withholding "of taxes," as the Court's own description confirms ("§ 60501
(reporting by businesses of large cash receipts, arguably applicable to certain
gambling winnings or receipts).") 7 The effect of the misstatement is to give
credibility to the Court's speculative assumption that Congress' inclusion of
IRC chapter 35 in the parenthetical was a singular mistaken oversight.
The Court implicitly conceded the Nations' arguments that chapter 35's
inclusion made the statute ambiguous.
But what about chapter 35? The Tribes correctly point out that
chapter 35 has nothing to do with "reporting and withholding."
They add that the reference must serve some purpose, and the only
purpose that the Tribes can find is that of expanding the scope of
the Gaming Act's subsection beyond reporting and withholding
15. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 87 (2001). Tellingly, in initially
describing chapter 35 as one that "simply imposes taxes," the Court omitted mentioning that the
chapter also expressly exempts from those taxes state lotteries. That early statement belies a
perspective permeating the Opinion.





provisions - to the tax-imposing provisions that chapter 35 does
contain. The Gaming Act therefore must exempt them (like States)
from those tax payment requirements. The Tribes add that at least
the reference to chapter 35 makes the subsection ambiguous. And
they ask us to resolve the ambiguity by applying a special Indian-
related interpretative canon, namely, "'statutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians' with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit."' 8
In its struggle to reject the Tribes' position by finding no ambiguity and
therefore avoid application of the Indian-law canon, the Court built a platform
grounded on judicial inconsistency. First, the Court attempted to avoid
statutory ambiguity by segregating the ambiguity-creating language in the
parenthetical from the rest of the statute, thereby implicitly violating the
general statutory canon recognized by Justice Scalia at oral argument that
every word of a statue should be given effect: "[f]or one thing, the language
outside the parenthetical is unambiguous."' 9 Then, the Court said, in laying
its premise for rewriting the statute: "[n]or can one give the chapter 35
reference independent operative effect without seriously rewriting the
language of the rest of the statute."2
In the very next paragraph of its opinion, the Court contradicted that all-
important premise by recognizing two possible readings (therefore confirming
the existence of ambiguity) and acknowledging that the statute's language
permits a reading that gives effect to every word of the statute and thereby
securing the tax-exemption for the Nations:
We recognize the Tribes' claim (made here for the first time) that
one could avoid rewriting the statute by reading the language
outside the parenthetical as if it referred to two kinds of
"provisions of the ... Code": first, those "concerning the reporting
and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from
gaming," and, second, those "concerning... wagering operations."
The subsection's grammar literally permits this reading.2'
Under the test authored by Justice Scalia in County of Yakima, the Court's
acknowledgment of the actual possibility of the Nations' construction and its
effect should have immediately ended the inquiry with a victory for the
18. Id. (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 89.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
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Nations. The statute was ambiguous and the Nations' construction of the
statute was possible.
Without mentioning County of Yakima, or any other authority, and without
any explanation of any deficiency in the Nations' construction, the Court
adopted a new test, "the far too convoluted" standard, ostensibly in lieu of the
test in County of Yakima: "[B]ut that reading, even if ultimately comprehen-
sible, is far too convoluted to believe Congress intended it. Nor is there any
reason to think Congress intended to sweep within the subsection's scope
every Internal Revenue Code provision concerning wagering - a result that
this unnatural reading would accomplish." 2 The Court offered no test for
determining when a grammatically permissible construction expressly
comprehended and acknowledged by the Court is "far too convoluted" to
represent congressional intent.
The Court then employed language clearly in conflict with the Indian-law
canon that in County of Yakima focused on possibility without reference to
plausibility or any other evaluation of competing constructions in resolving
ambiguity in favor of Indian interests. In so doing, the Court, without
reference to any support whatsoever, speculated that the ambiguity causing
parenthetical reference to chapter 35 was inadvertently ihcluded (the Nations'
grammatically permissible reading to the contrary notwithstanding) and
therefore did not require a rewriting of the statute (that the Nations' possible
construction would avoid anyway). The Court stated:
As we have said, the more plausible role for the parenthetical to
play in this subsection is that of providing an illustrative list of
examples. So considered, "chapter 35" is simply a bad example -
an example that Congress included inadvertently. The presence of
a bad example in a statute does not warrant rewriting the remainder
of the statute's language. Nor does it necessarily mean that the
statute is ambiguous, i.e., "capable of being understood in two or
more possible senses or ways."23
22. Id. The Court's use of "even if ultimately comprehensible" is puzzling. Obviously, the
Court ultimately comprehended the Nation's reading because the Opinion not only clearly
explained the Nations' reading, but also acknowledged that the statutory language "literally
permits this reading." The Opinion offers no authority suggesting that the time of initial
comprehension is a factor, much less the dispositive factor, in resolving ambiguity in Indian law
statutes.




The Court's reasoning is remarkable. First, the Court cited nothing to
support its speculation.24 Second, the Nations' grammatically permissible
construction, already acknowledged by the court, rebutted the speculation of
inadvertent inclusion. Third, as the Court earlier noted, the Nations'
construction resulted in the very rewriting which the Court claimed that its
speculation was intended to prevent. Finally, the Court's earlier
acknowledgment of the actually possible and grammatically correct
construction by the Nations rendered wrong the Court's critical assertion that
ambiguity "capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or
ways,"is not present.25
B. The Portion of the Legislative History Included by the Court
The second portion of the Court's analysis addressed, in an incomplete
way, legislative history. The Court focused on the substitution of the more
specific IRC "chapter 35" (containing the taxing provisions as well as the
exemption-granting language at issue here) for the more general "taxation"
contained in earlier drafts of the bill that ultimately became IGRA. The Court
posed the question: "Why did it [the Senate Committee] permit the cross-
reference to chapter 35 to remain [after deleting the "taxation" language]?9
26
The Court's question was inaccurately phrased and appears to have been
crafted to support an undocumented conclusion. There is no evidence that
"taxation" and the reference to "chapter 35" were in any legislative draft at the
same time. In other words, the Court's premise that "taxation" was deleted
after "chapter 35" had been included and allowed to remain in the draft text
is pure speculation unsupported by the legislative history, as lack of citation
in the Opinion confirms and the dissent notes.
The more accurate inquiries should have been why did the Committee agree
to the substitution of "chapter 35" in subsequent legislation for "taxation" in
prior drafts and why did Congress adopt the statutory language? Although the
Court attempts to address those inquiries in a roundabout manner, in doing so
24. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent joined by Justice Souter, expressly referenced this
portion of the Opinion as "speculation." "The Court can do no more than speculate that the
bill's drafters included the parenthetical while the original restriction was in place and failed to
remove it when that restriction was altered." Id. at 97.
25. If the Court recognized the presence of ambiguity in the statute before its judicial
modification, the Court would then have to either apply the Indian-law canon or actually hold
for the first time that the canon did not apply in cases of statutory ambiguity involving a claim
of tax-exemption by Indians.
26. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 91 (2001).
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the Court omitted a critical part of the legislative history stressed at oral
argument. The committee report accompanying the initial draft of the bill,
contained the word "taxation" and indicated that taxation was synonymous
with IRC chapter 35. In commenting on section 4 of House Bill 1920,7 the
House Committee Report expressly identified two portions of the IRC, 26
U.S.C. § 3402(q) (involving only reporting and withholding of taxes related
to the operation of gaming activities), and chapter 35 (both authorizing the
taxes and creating the state gaming exemption from them at issue). That
report stated:
Section 4 provides that related provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, such as section 3402(q) and Chapter 35, 26 U.S.C.,
concerning taxation and the reporting and withholding of taxes
relating to the operation of gaming activities shall apply to tribal
gaming activities as they apply to State operated gaming
activities."
In light of that explanation, which preceded the substitution of IRC
"chapter 35" for "taxation" in the draft legislation, the replacement of the
specific by the general not only makes sense but also is consistent with both
the intention of tribal representatives mentioned in the Opinion and the
Nations' construction. That piece of legislative history, omitted by the Court
and expressly known by the Opinion's author as a result of his questioning at
oral argument, 9 impeaches the Court's speculative premise on which depends
its ultimate reading out of chapter 35 from the statute - that IRC chapter 35
remained in the draft legislation as mistaken inadvertence. That complete
legislative history, as opposed to the portions selected by the Court for
inclusion in its Opinion, does not "on balance" support the Court's conclusion
and justify rejection of the Nations' construction.
C. Treatment of the Indian-Law Canon in Dictum
The final section of the Opinion addressed the Indian-law canon. The
section's very existence is unusual because having earlier determined that only
one construction existed, that no ambiguity was present, and that the
legislative history supported the Court's interpretation of the then partially
27. H.R. 1920, 99th Cong. § 4 (1986),
28. H.R. REP. No. 99-488, at 13 (1986).
29. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Chickasaw Nation (No. 00-507), available at 2001




excised statute, the canons had become legally irrelevant to the disposition of
the case. Nevertheless, the Court pursued a lengthy discussion containing
several significant new items of dicta.
The Court opened its treatment of the Indian-law canon by diminishing its
legal importance with the observation that the canons are not mandatory
rules.3" In stating that the canons are subservient to other indications of
congressional intent, the Court implicitly moved the canons further toward the
foot of the List of tools available to resolve ambiguity behind, at least
implicitly, the newly approved tool of speculation as to the drafting process.
Tellingly, unlike in Chickasaw Nation, none of the three Indian law cases
cited by the Court to bolster that action involved actual textual ambiguity.
Of particular note, the Court appeared to adopt a new test for application
of the Indian-law canon and therefore to implicitly abandon the test in County
of Yakima. "In light of the considerations discussed earlier, we cannot say that
the statute is 'fairly capable' of two interpretations, nor that the Tribes'
interpretation is fairly 'possible."' 31 No guidance was given as to when a
construction either satisfies the "fairly possible" test or falls short of that new
qualitative standard. Because the Court already had pronounced the then
rejected Nations' construction as "grammatically possible," the new test
appeared to require something more than grammatical accuracy as a condition
precedent to the application of the canons.
The Court, consistent with its earlier announced result, also diminished the
general canon requiring that effect be given to every statutory word if possible
by offsetting the canon with the power of courts to reject statutory language
"as surplusage" if "inadvertently inserted or repugnant to the rest of the
statute."32 No Supreme Court decision in support of that rule was cited.
Further, the Court, without detailed analysis of the facts of any of its prior
decisions recognizing tax-exemptions for Indians by application of the Indian-
law canon to acknowledged textual ambiguity, offset the Indian-law canon
with the general tax-exemption maxim that exemptions must be clearly stated.
The Court invoked three decisions to support its offsetting dicta. Two did not
involve Indians.33 The single Indian-law case cited by the Court granted to
30. The Court's diminution of the canons' importance was underscored by the Court's
acknowledgment that the Courts' construction violated both the general canon requiring that
every clause and word of a statute should if possible be given effect and the Indian-law canon
that statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit. See Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94.
31. Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id.
33. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351 (1988); United States Trust Co. v.
No. 2]
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Indians an exemption from federal taxation by applying the Indian-law canon
after expressly noting, and failing to apply, the general tax-exemption
maxim.34 The Court then refused to follow its prior Indian tax-exemption
decisions involving actual textual ambiguity on the ground that those cases
were "too individualized, involving too many different kinds of legal
circumstances" to be of value,35 although those prior cases were quoted by the
Court with approval in previous decisions.36 To further downplay that
precedent, the Court failed to note that the first group of its cited decisions (in
which the Indian canon was applied and the exemption allowed) included
textual ambiguity and the comparative second group (in which the general tax
maxim was applied and the Indian-law canon not discussed) involved no
textual ambiguity, but only asserted policy as the basis for the claimed
exemption. The Court failedto acknowledge the critical, and correct, points
made by the Nations that when confronted by a claim of tax-exemption by
Indians premised on textual ambiguity, the Court had always applied the
Indian-law canon to grant the exemption37 and that the general tax maxim was
applied only in the absence of textual ambiguity when the claimed exemption
was based on pure policy. 8
Lastly, in one sentence of dictum, unaccompanied by any citation to
authority, the Court cast doubt on the continued primacy and, perhaps even the
vitality, of the Indian-law canon in cases of statutory construction: "[nior can
one say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger - particularly where
the interpretation of a congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at
issue."39 The Court did not discuss its development of the Indian canon in
cases of statutory construction, including the canon's genesis from treaty
cases, the identical trust relationship undergirding the canon in both statutory
Helvering, 307 U. S. 57 (1939).
34. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
35. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 95.
36. As Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent, "This Court has repeatedly held that, when
these two canons conflict, the Indian canon predominates." Id. at 100.
37. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973); Squire v.
Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
38. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Superintendent of Five
Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691
(1931). Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent, "This Court has failed to apply the Indian canon
to extend tax-exemptions to the Nations only when nothing in the language of the underlying
statute or treaty suggest the Nations should be exempted." Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 10 1.




and treaty cases, and the Court's previously unbroken application of the canon
in cases of statutory textual ambiguity.4"
IV Observations on the Potential Impact of the Opinion
The long term impact of Chickasaw Nation on decisional Indian law, if any,
remains to be seen. Unfortunately for Indian interests, the Opinion contains
several indicia, albeit subtle, as to the Rehnquist Court's view towards
Indians. First and foremost, the Opinion demonstrates that to avoid "favorable
treatment" of Indians, the Court will read out a portion of a statute and reject
an admittedly grammatically correct construction of a statute in order to
destroy the presence of ambiguity and prevent application of the Indian-law
canons. In so doing, the Court has shown that it will abandon the long-held
test of the mere existence of a possible construction in favor of the Indians
(which requires no qualitative or quantitative weighing or determination of
degree) and replace it with the arbitrary, j udicially subjective, and unexplained
test that the Indians' construction be "fairly possible." Further, to foster its
newly revealed attitude toward Indians, the Court is willing to premise an
entire analysis on both speculation and the omission of a portion of the
legislative history, which impeaches that analysis.
The future of Indian law cases before the Rehnquist Court is further
darkened by the Court's treatment, in unnecessary dicta in Chickasaw Nation,
of the Indian-law canon. Not only did the Court use an inappropriate,
incomplete analysis to avoid application of the canon, but also the Court sent
the Indian-law canons to the end of the line of statutory tools of construction,
stating that they are offset by general canons and implying that they are
subservient to those general canons. The Court's express failure to recognize
its unbroken precedent of applying the Indian-law canons when tax-
exemptions were claimed by Indians because of textual ambiguity, the general
tax-exemption maxim notwithstanding, does not bode well for future
dominance of the Indian-law canons in any statutory context.
Finally, and most significantly, the Court's unexplained single sentence of
dicta, unsupported by any citation to authority, drawing a distinction of the
canon's "strength" in statutory cases from treaty cases, is particularly
alarming. The canon is undergirded by the same, constant trust relationship
of the federal government with the tribes, regardless of whether the ambiguity
40. Id. at 101. "As the purpose behind the Indian canon is the same regardless of the form
of enactment, there is no reason to alter the Indian canon's relative strength where a statute
rather than a treaty is involved." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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is statutory or treaty-based. If the Supreme Court is now diminishing the force
of that trust-based canon in cases of statutory construction, what then is the
Court's view of the continued vitality of the underlying congressionally
established trust-based relationship and of the Court's own power to diminish
or ultimately abolish that trust-based relationship? The mere fact that
Chickasaw Nations' dictum causes the question to be raised is significant
indeed.
V. Subsequent Supreme Court Developments Concerning
the Trust Relationship
Since Chickasaw Nation, the Court has taken two opportunities to address
trust relationships between the United States and Indian tribes, although
without citation to Chickasaw Nation. In UnitedStates v. Navajo Nation,4 the
same majority as in Chickasaw Nation, less Justice Stevens, refused to
recognize a claim for damages for breach of fiduciary duty based on the
Secretary of the Interior's conduct in approving a coal lease royalty increase
negotiated by the Navajo Nation. The Court held that the Secretary's
statutorily required approval power was not a trust responsibility. The dissent
by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, noted "serious
indications that the 12'/2 percent royalty rate in the lease amendments was
substantially less than fair market value for the Tribe's high quality coal," that
the Acting Assistant Secretary was prepared to approve a much higher
increase, that the higher increase was derailed by the Secretary only after an
ex parte meeting between the Secretary and coal company personnel, and that
the Secretary directed the Tribe be misled about the status of the adjustment
process.4 Utilizing ample supporting authority, the dissent made clear that
viewed in light of the "legislative history and the general trust relationship
between the United States and the Indians, [the statute in question] supports
the existence of a fiduciary responsibility to review mineral leases for
substance to safeguard the Indians' interests."'43 The dissent was unavailing.
In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,"' the Court recognized
a claim for restoration damages against the United States based on a statute
that gave lands, including Fort Apache, in trust for the use and benefit of the
41. 123 S. Ct. 1079(2003).
42. Id. at 1098 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1097 (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224-25
(1983) (Mitchell fl)).




Tribe and allowed the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and
improvements. The Court found that the express statutory trust language
coupled with the government's daily use of a portion of the property permits
a fair inference that the Government is subject to duties as a trustee and
potentially liable in damages for breach. The Court, in its opinion delivered
by Justice Souter, did not mention the general trust relationship invoked by
Justice Souter as support for a fiduciary duty in his dissent in Navajo Nation,
decided the same day.
Of substantial importance for the trust relationship's future is the dissent
in White Mountain Apache Tribe of Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief
Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, all in the majority in Chickasaw
Nation. That dissent invoked a court of claims decision in a patent attempt to
lower the status of the trust relationship:
The Court of Claims has observed that the relationship between the
United States and Indians is not governed by ordinary trust
principles: "The general relationship between the United States and
the Indian tribes is not comparable to a private trust relationship.
When the source of substantive law intended and recognized only
the general, or bare, trust relationship, fiduciary obligations
applicable to private trustees are not imposed on the United States.
Rather, the general relationship between Indian tribes and [the
United States] traditionally has been understood to be in the nature
of a guardian-ward relationship. A guardianship is not a trust. The
duties of a trustee are more intensive than the duties of some other
fiduciaries!"
With four votes for such a view, coupled with the rejection of fiduciary duties
in Navajo and the unsupported dictum in Chickasaw Nation, concern over the
future vitality of the general trust relationship under the Rehnquist Court
appears well founded.
45. Id. at 1138 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Cherokee Nation
of Okla. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 565, 573 (1990)).
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